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This paper evaluates the scope and functions of interdisciplinary connec-
tions for psychologists in dealing with its conceptual and methodological 
and sometimes political difficulties. Developing examples from my own 
context and practice, I indicate how feminist research has engaged with and 
addressed such questions. Brief consideration of three key epistemological 
turns in psychology, indicates that psychologists should neither uncritically 
turn to, nor turn away from, other disciplines but rather understand how 
what it is within such turns that indicates more about the nature of the 
conceptual, methodological and political problems we are trying to address.
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In this paper I address the ways we ‘turn’ to other 
disciplines to help psychology out of its difficulties, 
difficulties that, as I will argue, are conceptual, 
methodological and also difficulties of legitimacy. 
I will propose that we should neither uncritically 
turn to, nor turn away from, other disciplines; but 
rather that we need to understand more about 
the nature of the conceptual, methodological and 
political problems we are trying to address. These 
arguments will first be illustrated through three 
examples drawn from research projects I have been 
involved with to highlight some of the complicated 
issues at stake in the relations between disciplines, 
including when and how they become relevant, 
and when disciplinary distinctions turn out to be 
far less important than other issues. The examples 
will then be used to illustrate my concern here with 
‘disciplines’, addressing the question of disciplines 
in a double sense: first, in terms of the role of inter- 
and trans-disciplinary perspectives in formulating a 
more engaged, critical and reflexive psychological 
theory and practice; and in that regard, second, 
how this attention to relations between disciplines 
also provides better understanding of how psychol-
ogy itself functions in disciplinary ways, in terms of 
generating and supporting a model of subjectivity 
as reflexive and self-regulating.
In particular, I make a case for the specific role 
of feminist analyses in countering the damaging 
effects of psychology, and in helping build alliances 
and solidarities with other disciplines that do not 
merely uncritically dissolve psychology into those 
other disciplines, nor allow for a too simple coexis-
tence across and between disciplines. Indeed it could 
be argued that feminist perspectives are necessarily 
‘antipsychological’, in the sense of critiquing and 
exposing the ideological (including ideologies of 
gender and gender relations) forms and functions 
of the discipline (see Squire, 1990). While feminist 
perspectives are not unique in this respect, they 
do offer a particularly useful critical and analytic 
lens through which to approach the question of 
disciplines in relation to psychology. Through this 
analysis, then, I will claim a place for what we might 
call ‘antipsychology’ as a legitimate - and indeed 
relevant and useful - response to psychology, and 
for feminist perspectives as a key resource for anti-
psychological psychologists. 
In the final part of the paper, I link this discus-
sion of disciplines to discuss three major ‘turns’ that 
have swept across the social and human sciences: 
the deconstructionist turn, the psychosocial turn, 
and the neopositivist turn. I will suggest some ways 
the first two can help us to manage the third. In 
these postmodern days, these turns are of course 
neither exactly successive nor even absolutely dis-
tinct; however, precisely because of this, we need to 
be alert to their continuities as well as challenges. 
So let me start with the practical examples.
Example One: A developmental 
psychologist in childhood studies
In its early years (at least in the UK), childhood 
studies (sometimes known as the ‘new sociology of 
childhood’) was very hostile to psychology, which 
was seen as responsible for a model of the child as 
deficient, incompetent and generally lacking.1 This 
was in contrast to the ‘competent social actor’ and 
rights wielding model of the child that was being 
formulated from sociology and anthropology (See 
e.g. James & Prout, 1990; Jenks, 1996). Here was 
a direct disciplinary clash, such that – as a critical 
developmental psychologist, I was regarded with 
suspicion when I attended at early interdisciplin-
ary events held to discuss and publicise this new 
research area. However, this hostility could tip into 
its opposite. Childhood studies soon discovered 
its own developmental limits and could suddenly 
become over-deferential to psychology. So my role 
as a critical (feminist) developmental psycholo-
gist, engaged in discussion and dialogue with this 
emerging hybrid discipline called ‘childhood stud-
ies’, has been both to show that there is sustained 
1   This concept derives from psychology’s association with and re-
sponsibility for stage models of child and individual development 
in terms of successive shifts of qualitative changes (although of 
course psychology was only of many disciplines influenced by this 
structuralist turn). It should be noted that whereas initially such 
attention to qualitative change was heralded as enabling a more 
appreciative evaluation of children as different from, rather than 
lesser or deficient forms of, adults in recent years such attention 
to developmental limits was seen as exclusionary and oppressive.Disciplines for anD against psychology
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critique within the discipline of psychology (see 
e.g. Burman, 2008a, 2008b; Henriques, Hollway, 
Urwin, Venn & Walkerdine, 1984; Morss, 1996; 
Walkerdine, 1988), and also to help formulate a 
more robust framework for theory and practice in 
childhood studies that does not unthinkingly lapse 
back into the discourse of stages or competence 
limits of traditional psychology.
But – to connect with my theme of feminism 
as an analytic resource - in many countries, the 
central issue in childhood studies is less disciplinary 
than pro or antifeminist. Or rather, how the con-
ceptualisations around, and corresponding policy 
and practice interventions for, children connect 
with those proposed in relation to women. In the 
(over)developed world some varieties of childhood 
studies have been antifeminist – generated as a mis-
taken response to the ways women and children’s 
interests have been treated as equivalent (and react-
ed against also by some feminist movements) (Bur-
man, 2008a). Elsewhere, perhaps precisely because 
of the clarity of ways that women’s and children’s 
issues coincide ‘on the ground’, and in particular 
as the last sector of the poor to be mobilised for ex-
ploitation by multinational capital (Nieuwenhuys, 
2007), feminists are very active around children’s 
issues. Of course this des not mean that there are 
not also significant silences or absences of feminist 
debate and intervention that reveal the class and 
cultural backgrounds and collusions of feminist 
movements too (as Balagopalan, in press, highlights 
in relation to the Indian feminist movement’s failure 
to challenge the government over early marriage).
I hope the key points I have made so far are 
obvious: first, that simple disciplinary transfer or 
replacement often does not solve the problems 
that prompted such excursions; second, that mak-
ing alliances across disciplines is very important; 
and third, that one can be a deconstructionist 
critic within one’s discipline but still a disciplinary 
representative (as also a resident critic) in others.
Example Two: Disciplines blurred/
psychology in culture – ‘Gemma’
My second example takes the form of a discursive 
analysis, speaking to the textual turn in psychology, 
which also situates psychology as a social practice 
within wider sociopolitical and cultural practices. 
The text I discuss here is a recent advertisement 
that appeared in various UK national newspapers 
and magazines as an advertising campaign to pro-
mote recruitment to social work training. In terms 
of the connection with psychological theory and 
practice, its ‘marketing message’ emphasised the 
personal, rewarding character of social work, with 
the tagline ‘Social work; it’s all about people’2 and 
including the reward of making a difference by 
giving her ‘a new chance, a new beginning’. In do-
ing so contemporary readers of this text would of 
course know (here mobilizing their everyday cul-
tural competence, that is central to any analysis) 
that this focus on personal engagement and sense 
of efficacy is explicitly being formulated to counter 
the general received perception of social work (at 
least as it functions in the UK) as the key state 
agency involved in assessing and regulating families. 
In particular social workers are especially central 
in central in removing children from families who 
are deemed neglectful or abusive (such that they 
are also the first professional group to be blamed 
in cases where children have died). Even though 
this is an advertisement (rather than a scholarly or 
‘serious’ text), it is important to clarify that it is still 
worthy of analysis. Indeed (after Goffman, 1979), 
it is especially because it is an advertisement that it 
is particularly useful to analyse, since the work of 
crafting its various textual and textured messages 
makes it a cultural repository of ideological features.
2   The small print under the illustration reads: ‘People can be 
fascinating mystifying and rewarding. social work is work with 
people, it’s that simple and that complicated. to find about more 
about training to be a qualified social worker, with a starting 
salary of at least £13,500, call for a booklet on 0845 604 6404 or 
visit www.socialworkandcare.co.uk’ The main logo ‘ Social work’ 
carries the subtitle or tagline ‘It’s all about people’.Erica Burman
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As with any first stage of analysis,3 we need to 
describe the text. The main text adopts a graphic 
novel format showing a story. The ‘sad little story’ 
announces itself with a general claim (expressed in 
graffiti-like writing) that ‘teenagers are troubled’. 
But specifically it is about ‘Gemma’ who is ‘not-so-
sweet sixteen’, ‘Gemma’ is portrayed in various situ-
ations of neglect (sitting at the foot of her mother’s 
bed, with her mother unconscious through alcohol 
misuse) (‘mother hands on misery to daughter’), risk 
(hanging around on the with other girls smoking 
and wearing short skirts) (‘you can see how it could 
end’) and self harming through distress (burning 
her forearms with cigarettes) (‘It’s her way of show-
ing she’s hurting inside’). Having established the 
problem, the story is redemptive; describing ‘your’ 
interventions to help ‘Gemma’ to trust again and 
express her feelings in more constructive ways 
(Gemma comes to live in your children’s home. But 
old habits die hard. You give her ice cubes. Holding 
them gives her the same feeling of release. In time 
it’s not only the ice that melts. You help Gemma 
learn to trust again’, ending with an image of a key 
(a doorkey?) inscribed with the word ‘hope’. 
In terms of preliminary analysis, we might note 
that naturalised, psychological ‘truths’ are offered, in 
relation to: (1) notions of ‘development’ (mobiliz-
ing understandings of ‘adolescence’ as a life stage 
associated with distinct challenges, with the claim 
“teenagers are troubled”); (2) ideas of prediction/
teleology (with the phrases “you can see how it can 
end”; “it’s a sad little story”); (3) subscribing to the 
notion that there are cycles of deprivation (as in 
“mother hands on misery to daughter” and even 
in relation to models of (individual) addiction – 
“old habits die hard”). These (contestable) ‘truths’ 
are posed by an assertive, but unspecified, autho-
rial voice of unquestionable expertise that uses the 
present tense of general, universal applicability, of 
timeless truth – as in the claim that “teenagers are 
troubled” - that blurs or even occludes questions of 
3   Fairclough (1989) for example, structures the process of analy-
sis into three stages: description, interpretation and evaluation. 
See also Parker (1992); Parker et al. (1999), Burman and Parker 
(1993).
causality (so we do not ask: why are they troubled?); 
it occludes questions of contextuality (where are 
they troubled?, and how?), and so makes it all seem 
inevitable. In terms of constitution of audience (in-
terpellation), the text addresses its reader (“you”) 
directly, as supplying the missing paternal/authori-
tative figure; as the putative social worker, “you” 
are powerful, and come to the rescue of this failed/
motherless (and, though less explicitly topicalised, 
fatherless) girl. The trappings of the welfare state 
are personalised as your possessions (“your foster 
home”), and it is “your” work that helps and heals 
(“you help Gemma to trust again”). Moreover, there 
is a therapeutic narrative of re-socialisation through 
personal attention and healing; of facilitative care 
and intimacy as transformative (an ironic juxtaposi-
tion with how most people experience social work 
interventions, sadly). 
Some further reflections can be added to this. 
Firstly, social workers are here portrayed as societal 
saviours, heroically warding off the apparently al-
most inevitable repetition (of addiction, self-harm 
etc.), and importing “hope” and “a new beginning”. 
Secondly, this works to privilege the interventions 
of an individual to an individual (“you give her ice 
cubes”; “you help Gemma to trust again”).
So two main themes emerge concerning the role 
of psychological practice, as mobilized and repre-
sented in this professional recruitment campaign: 
firstly, the psychological frameworks bolster an 
individualisation both at the level of explanations 
on offer (rather than focusing on societal neglect, 
material deprivation etc.) and of form of interven-
tion (exemplified by the therapeutic narrative that 
exonerates “it’s her way of showing that she’s hurt-
ing inside”). This individualisation has other effects 
(including making individuals responsible – thus 
fostering mother-blaming, as a particular – and 
particularly noxious - form of victim-blaming). 
Moreover the focus on the story of thwarted devel-
opment (“a sad little story”) recapitulates the classic 
emphasis in psychology on the abnormal/pathological, 
in terms of how the normal (of psychology, i.e. the 
normalised, typical subject or unit of development) 
is produced through its relation with its margins; 
this focus on the abnormal/pathological is indica-Disciplines for anD against psychology
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tive of psychology’s role in adaptation/regulation 
(see Phoenix, 1987).
So, drawing on the kind of discursive analysis 
that deconstructionist approaches enable, this 
example highlights the ways that psychological 
ideas circulate as culture and are mobilised within 
the technical claims to expertise of other profes-
sions and disciplines, in ways that we, as critically-
engaged psychologists as well as general cultural 
critics, might want to interrogate and challenge. 
Moreover, this text – in its visual and discursive 
features - this campaign works at the level of emo-
tions (of the fear of danger; of the satisfaction of 
being helpful) rather than explicit prescription, 
employing the tropes of femininity to connote 
more general vulnerability through cultural – even 
filmic- codes (for its blurry graphics, indistinct and 
metropolitan imagery recalls the genre of thrillers). 
This appeal to the popular and to feelings can also 
be understood as part of a wider psychosocial turn 
that I will discuss later.
Example Three: Gender and violence, 
resisting psychologisation
Over the past 10 years I have been involved in four 
(inter- or multidisciplinary) projects concerned with 
supporting women experiencing domestic violence, 
in particular minoritised women – that is, women 
from minority ethnic, cultural and religious back-
grounds – living in the UK. This involvement arose 
through a rather strange set of connections – that, 
significantly, were neither disciplinary nor topic-
related4. The topics ranged from service provision 
around attempted suicide and self harm (Burman, 
Chantler & Batsleer, 2002; Chantler, Burman 
& Batsleer, 2003; Chantler, Burman, Batsleer & 
Bashir, 2001); domestic violence support provision 
for minoritised women (Batsleer et al., 2002; Bur-
man, Smailes & Chantler, 2004; Chantler, 2006); 
4   The term minoritisation is used to highlight how women from 
minority groups living in the UK acquire such status as the out-
come of a relational process, that is, in relation to a majoritised 
groups, rather than (only) as a feature of their identities (see 
Burman & Chantler, 2005; Burman et al., 2004; see also Gupta, 
2003). 
Pakistani women who become asylum seekers in 
the UK by virtue of experiencing domestic violence 
(Burman, 2010; Siddiqui, Ismail & Allen, 2008); 
and identifying and responding to forced marriage 
(Burman & Chantler, 2009; Chantler, Gangoli & 
Hester, 2009; Gangoli & Chantler, 2009). I will 
attempt to indicate the emergent logic for this se-
quence of topics.
The key point I want to make here is that in 
these projects, my academic discipline was irrel-
evant; or rather subordinated to a feminist/activist 
history. But even more than this, the analysis that 
emerged from the projects worked to challenge 
conventional disciplinary demarcations, and es-
pecially the three key ways these demarcations 
function in public and political discourse around 
violence. Firstly, the work challenged the public/
private boundary, a division that is profoundly 
gendered, and also one of the key reasons why 
violence in the home is not typically considered a 
matter of public concern or intervention (Chantler 
et al., 2009; Hanmer & Itzin, 2000). But the dis-
ciplinary trajectory of our projects was indicative 
and indeed educative: it was part of what educated 
us. From a background of working to document 
innovative mental health practices for minoritised 
groups (Burman, Gowrisunkur & Sangha, 1998; 
Burman, Walker & Gowrisunkur, 2003; Gow-
risunkur, Burman & Walker, 2002) we were initially 
invited to conduct a project on a mental health 
issue (attempted suicide and self harm). However 
we identified this as a public order/public health 
issue – since the reason many of the women we in-
terviewed were attempting suicide or self harming 
was because they were in abusive relationships (see 
Burman et al., 2002). 
Moreover, second, we also challenged the sepa-
ration between state and family violence. For our 
projects provided documentation of how state op-
pression – in the form of immigration controls – 
enabled the abuse and violence to take place, by 
trapping women in the violent relationships – as 
where husbands or partners said ‘if you leave me 
I’ll report you to the authorities and you will be 
deported’, so terrorising the woman into staying. 
We also documented how, apart from culturally-Erica Burman
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specific domestic violence services, commissioners 
and providers of domestic violence services failed to 
recognise or acknowledge this additional barrier to 
accessing domestic violence service support, and so 
largely maintained the wider victim-blaming mod-
els of why women stayed in abusive relationships 
(Burman & Chantler, 2005; Burman et al., 2004).
Finally, through this we challenged the classed 
and racialised discourse structuring understandings 
of which women are abused, and which men are the 
abusers, by showing how dominant discourses and 
practices produce differential structures of visibility 
and invisibility. This also worked to counter the 
disproportionate focus on minoritised women, and 
minority communities who – as usually among the 
poorest – are also most subject to public scrutiny 
in the form of having to access public services (if 
they can – which many cannot because non-citizens 
have no such ‘recourse to public funds), while do-
mestic violence in the middle classes escapes notice 
(Burman et al., 2004)5.
Thus in these projects we were working across 
disciplines, to demonstrate the interconnected 
character of state, cultural, familial and interperson-
al practices. This was a feminist antiracist approach 
that, perhaps, arguably, did not need particular 
disciplinary expertise (but included social work-
ers, counsellors, lawyers and community develop-
ment workers). However some kinds of disciplinary 
knowledge became relevant in the sense of high-
lighting the need to challenge psychologisation. So, 
it was important to highlight that the question of 
provision around attempted suicide and self harm 
was not, or not only, a mental health problem but 
rather pointed to other sets of problems that needed 
to be addressed at the level of public health, public 
order and state immigration policies. The same 
went for the tropes around ‘cycles of violence’ (and 
other forms of victim-blaming) that domestic vio-
lence workers and service managers reached for 
5   And so in the contexts we were researching, where poor women 
who had citizenship status were able to access public services 
(whereas those who were not could not), in many respects middle 
class women were the least well provided for (especially as their 
economic resources usually relied upon the spouse they were at-
tempting to get away from).
too easily, and often in racialised ways, to account 
for why and how certain groups of women seemed 
to figure within, or alternatively to be absent from, 
their services. To sum up, my contribution was as 
someone helping to address wider audiences and 
support knowledge claims. But I could have been a 
sociologist or social policy researcher except insofar 
as I could help to dissect the forms of psychological 
discourse in culture that underpinned some of the 
representations of the minoritised domestic vio-
lence victim or survivor.6 Hence this example shows 
the necessary intersection between subject disci-
plines and state power, and this links to the stakes 
in resisting the neopositivist revival discussed later.
Feminisms as in/discipline
In highlighting feminist analyses as a significant 
resource for psychologists I should make clear what 
I mean by these. I am not talking about simple 
female supremacism; nor a blurring of femininity 
and feminism; nor even a transcending of embod-
ied sex/gender relations, as would be implied by 
prevailing discourses of gender neutrality, which 
paradoxically typically work to reinstate gender 
normativity in the name of erasing it (see Smart 
& Sevenhuijsen, 1989).
Clearly defining ‘feminism’ or a ‘feminist per-
spective’ is tricky – no longer is it tenable to de-
scribe feminist research ‘for women, by women, 
with women’, for example, as was the case in the 
early days of feminist research (e.g. Oakley, 1981; 
Stanley & Wise, 1983). This was at a moment of 
perhaps necessary corrective to malestream models, 
but only instituting its own exclusions. Now it is 
generally acknowledged that a gender analysis ap-
plies to all social issues – from ecology to economy 
(and perhaps especially these). So I will follow Lom-
bardo and Verloo’s recent proposal of a procedural 
definition, in suggesting that feminist analyses can 
be ‘characterised by ongoing struggle around the 
6   Indeed the problems of crossing disciplines to publish work 
such as this can usher in another set of problems, since – as I 
encountered – expectations about reporting of methodological 
and theoretical frameworks differ across disciplines even between 
the social sciences.Disciplines for anD against psychology
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proliferation of contested visions of gender equal-
ity and different debates on notions of gender, 
sex, and relations of domination and subordina-
tion’ (Lombardo & Verloo, 2009, p. 110). These 
struggles are ‘ongoing’ because of the centrality of 
focus on change, and because of the necessary and 
continuous debate between a variety of irreconcil-
able debates between/within feminist movements 
(giving rise to what Judith Butler, 1993, has called 
‘productive antagonism’).
So feminist debates span questions of sameness 
and difference (between men and women, and 
between women too), and are transformative of all 
gender norms. Politically, Lombardo and Verloo 
highlight that discussions can be seen as relating to 
inclusion via the principle of equality; they reverse 
prevailing gender norms via principle of difference, 
and displace them via the principle of transforma-
tion. Crucially, these not only characterise models 
of gender but also how these function in relation 
to psychology (see Burman, 1998; Squire, 1990). 
Feminist critiques of psychology have ranged in 
strategy, methodology and topic. They span criti-
cisms of prevailing gendered patterning of achieve-
ment, (whether underachievement or overachieve-
ment, see Francis & Skelton, 2005; Walkerdine & 
The Girls and Mathematics Unit, 1990), of repre-
sentation in mental health and illness statistics (for 
depression, or ADHD etc, see Timimi, 2005). They 
also highlight and critique gendered assumptions 
functioning at a more abstract level as inscribed 
within the terms of models of individual develop-
ment – as in the ways the rational unitary subject of 
cognitive development reproduces a culturally mas-
culine trajectory from attachment to detachment 
(Walkerdine, 1988), to the celebration of rational 
autonomy (qualities whose limits we are now begin-
ning to see in current economic and ecological cri-
ses). Even the arrow of time has attracted feminist 
critique for its abstraction and unilinearity (Kofsky 
Scholnick, 2000). The shift to a post-industrial, 
neoliberal order privileges individual skills rather 
than muscle strength (what Morini, 2007, calls cog-
nitive capitalism), calling for flexible skills rather 
than manual labour, and includes the emotional 
skills to be able to adapt and manage one’s feelings 
under such precarious conditions. But far from be-
ing displaced, in these new economic times which 
have both questioned rationality (of the markets) 
and ushered in this ‘knowledge society’ psychology 
seems to be acquiring a new role in the assessment 
and regulation of subjectivity. Hence we need to 
be vigilant about its practices as well as its effects, 
and feminist psychologists are, I would suggest, well 
placed to highlight the implicit as well as explicit 
ways oppressive psychological models and assump-
tions are at work.
Indeed there are fateful continuities as well as 
tensions between feminist and psychological analy-
ses – particularly in the Anglophone context where 
the second wave feminism of the 1970s and 1980s 
of ‘the personal is political’ made connections be-
tween the public and private spheres and legitimat-
ed the domain of the emotional (and the move of 
many feminists and leftwing radicals into therapy, 
as clients and practitioners). Notwithstanding these 
connections, especially in the current political con-
text of advanced capitalism, or neoliberalism, there 
are particular issues around which playing up the 
antagonism between feminist and psychological 
analyses can be useful. In particular, they are useful 
for the analysis of psychologization (the incitement 
to work on oneself and one’s relationships which has 
become a key feature of neoliberal governmentality) 
and feminisation (ditto). It helps to have a feminist 
critique of these, including how feminisation is not 
feminism and that women have much to worry 
about in the celebration of supposedly feminine 
relational and intuitional qualities now entering the 
business and education arenas under neoliberalism 
(Burman, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2009). These wider 
cultural-political developments mean that the ques-
tion of disciplines is paradoxically both more and 
less relevant. So now I will turn to address why the 
question of ‘discipline’ is crucial both to psychology 
and to critiques of psychology.
Turning to disciplines
There is a great deal of talk in the literature call-
ing for interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary ap-
proaches – especially in research aiming to be Erica Burman
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socially engaged and anti-oppressive (if not eman-
cipatory). Hence in a significant position paper 
Denzin (2006) call for a ‘methodology of the heart, 
a prophetic feminist postpragmatism that embraces 
an ethic of truth grounded in love, care, hope and 
forgiveness’ (p. 770) as a counter current revivals of 
‘methodological fundamentalism’. Central to these 
discussions are calls for the celebration of paradigm 
proliferation as a means of prompting the project 
of ‘coloring epistemologies’ (or highlighting the di-
versity of cultural tools and tracing through their 
political consequences) to ward off the perpetu-
ation of conservative, malestream dynamics (see 
Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Lather, 2006). 
Now psychology, as a discipline, has some trou-
ble maintaining itself as distinct. Although we may 
make much of psychology’s claims to be special as a 
profession with a specific practice as well as a subject 
area (unlike sociology, for example), its notions of 
function and unit of analysis are always vulnerable 
to being defined by other disciplines. Writing of the 
inception of the ‘psy complex’, Rose (1985) argued 
that psychological analysis has always tended to 
resolve into the medical, due to the lack of clarity 
over what would count as good functioning, and 
indeed what functions to count (unlike, say, those 
functions doctors could draw upon in describing 
the health or disease of a specific organ). Indeed, it 
is likely that our preoccupation in psychology with 
method betrays a core uncertainty and anxiety 
about the viability of any such attempts to gener-
ate meaningful psychological measurements (Mi-
chell, 1997, 2004; Trendler, 2009). As Chamberlain 
(2000) notes, this preoccupation with methodology 
has also tended to migrate into qualitative research, 
sometimes at the expense of the ethical-political 
aims inspiring it in the first place (see also Burman 
& Whelan, in press). In Britain, psychology is now 
officially a ‘health profession’, and psychologists – 
together with nurses and speech therapists and art 
therapists (for example) - must be registered under 
a ‘health professions council’.
But if it has trouble maintaining a distinct dis-
ciplinary identity, on the other hand, psychology 
clearly is part of the machinery of disciplining sub-
jects. That is, it is part of the culture of modernity 
that capitalism has produced, requiring sovereign 
citizens who are reflexive and self-regulating in the 
act of choosing, consuming and engaging with the 
market (Fendler, 2001). Psychologization, the in-
citement to work on oneself and one’s relationships, 
has become a key feature of neoliberal governmen-
tality (De Vos, 2009, in press; De Vos & Gordo 
Lopez, 2010), especially in the post-industrial eco-
nomic transition to a knowledge-society that privi-
leges relational skills and emotional literacy (Pop-
kewitz & Bloch, 2001). This has corresponded to a 
so-called feminisation of work, that for most people 
extends the insecurity and low pay of women’s tra-
ditional working conditions to men, so instigating 
new forms of oppression that far outweigh the few 
successful women who have made it through the 
‘glass ceiling’. The corollary of this in the global 
South includes how gender mainstreaming and 
tactical engagements with UNDP and World Bank 
initiatives have worked to reconfigure women’s tra-
ditional work into entrepreneurial activity ripe for 
investment via microcredit schemes (Batliwala & 
Dhanraj, 2007; Pearson, 2007). 
Hence psychologisation and feminisation are 
fatefully intertwined in their explicit focus on in-
strumentalising the domain of the personal (includ-
ing the home, the domestic and relational qualities). 
Both are linked to histories of individualism and the 
sedimentation of newer practices of individualisa-
tion that work to separate people from each other, 
and prevent wider reflection on the conditions 
producing such subjectivities. So, while in some 
ways women’s work has perhaps always stood out-
side the domain of patriarchal capitalist production 
(Staples, 2007), its affective features as well as tem-
poral and cultural capital are being colonised into 
global capitalism. As a correlate of the contraction 
of public sensibility and engagement under neolib-
eralism, there has been an expansion of the psy-
chological domain (in true voluntarist mode) from 
specialist expertise to ‘self-help’. We are currently 
surrounded by incitements to grow, learn, change 
yourself, make yourself better. In sum, to develop 
and demonstrate the flexibility and determination 
to optimise oneself (or what Fendler, 2001, termed 
‘developmentality’). Disciplines for anD against psychology
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I would also describe my disciplinary back-
ground as also based in women’s studies, an arena 
about which there is at least as much discussion 
about disciplinary identity, viability, distinctive-
ness as any other (see eg Buikema & Smelik, 1993; 
Richardson & Robinson, 1993). This discussion 
is highly charged theoretically, and politically; 
involving such questions as: what is a ‘woman’ 
– and is this viable as a general term, abstracted 
from ‘race’, class, culture? (Bhavnani, 2001; Riley, 
1988; Spelman, 1990). And, in particular, what is 
at stake in the general shift (that we have seen in 
the UK, at least) from women’s studies to gender 
studies, or gender relations or even sexuality stud-
ies, for example? Leaving these complex questions 
aside, for now I want to note that – notwithstand-
ing its necessarily trans- and inter-disciplinary 
character, the question of disciplinary orientation 
still arises in women’s studies (or gender studies or 
feminist studies, or whatever we might now want 
to call it). The epistemological project within 
women’s studies may be general, in terms of posing 
such questions as ‘who is a knower?’, ‘what counts 
as knowledge?’, ‘what does it mean for a women to 
be the subject (rather than object) of knowledge-
generation practices?’ (Harding, 1990; Stanley, 
1990). However, crucially, these questions assume 
different forms within different disciplines. 
I discovered this when team teaching with a 
colleague who had a humanities and literature 
background. We had to translate what these gen-
eral epistemological and ontological questions 
meant across the social and human sciences, as 
they took different form in each. This is especially 
relevant when we think about the social sciences’ 
and especially psychology’s preoccupation with 
‘method’ and ‘methodology’ (and there is good 
reason to think that psychology’s obsession with 
this works as some kind of defensive strategy, cov-
ering over some essential lack at its core, Trendler, 
2009). For in the humanities and literature, theory 
is method. And there is a key lesson for us here in 
the social sciences, and in psychology in particu-
lar; one that feminists have been highlighting for 
a long while, and qualitative researchers also have 
acknowledged: theory and method are necessarily 
inter-related; so while a specific method may not 
be specified by a particular theory, each theory 
invites more and less compatible methodological 
frameworks according to which its questions can 
be addressed.
II: Three turns
Having outlined the problematic of disciplines and 
some examples of the need to draw upon but also 
problematise cross-disciplinary relations, I will now 
move to discuss three theoretical turns that have 
structured much of the debate and discussion in 
social theory and practice, including in psychology.
1. Deconstruction: The turn to the text
A strategy taken up by feminist and other critics of 
psychology has been to take psychology’s claims and 
treat them as culturally-formulated and situated text 
(see also Burman et al., 1995; Burman et al., 1996; 
Parker, 2007; Parker & The Bolton Discourse Net-
work, 1999; Parker & Shotter, 1990; Richards, 1996. 
This involves locating psychological phenomena in 
their historical, cultural and geographical contexts, 
with an attention to how these contexts structure 
and nuance these phenomena differently. For this, 
we need to refer to other disciplines - history, soci-
ology, anthropology, for example – to highlight how 
what is typically claimed to be a stable, general, even 
timeless and universal phenomenon has arisen at a 
very particular time and place; and – adding in some 
political analysis – to serve a very particular set of 
social agendas (e.g. Rose, 1985, 1989).
For constructionists, including most people 
working in the humanities or even other social 
scientists, it is easy to underestimate how disturb-
ing these moves can be for psychologists. Treating 
mainstream psychological theory and practice as 
text disrupts its scientism and naïve realist claims, 
and facilitates attention to how the knowledge, 
‘facts’, norms and models are the outcome of spe-
cific contextual productions and interactions. At 
least eight features about this strategy contribute 
to a critical psychological practice:Erica Burman
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1.  The cultural-historical situatedness of the emer-
gence of particular forms of knowledge and 
practice is emphasised (as a specific challenge 
to the timelessness of scientistic psychology).
2.  The particular disciplinary practice of psy-
chology is embedded within wider contexts 
and so disrupts its specialist claims.
3.  The high/low culture binary of expert vs. popu-
lar/layperson is deconstructed, also highlighting 
the circularity of underlying conceptual models, 
cultural assumptions and political preoccupa-
tions
4.  The avowed position of psychology as neutral, 
value-free, detached etc, is thereby undermined 
including also how
5.  The authority of the psychologist (or other ‘ex-
pert’) is challenged
6.  The role of the theorist/story-teller in their 
theory/story is highlighted, so
7.  …rendering their account more contestable
8.  Inciting attention to the production of attribu-
tions of knowledge about, or to, people, includ-
ing destabilising claims to ‘give voice’ to research 
participants – in particular those who have 
previously been marginalised – such as children 
or minority groups (Alldred & Burman, 2005; 
Jackson & Mazzei, 2009).
Further, this concern with the practices and 
tactics of psychologisation also affords a warrant 
for some methodological latitude in selection of 
materials for analysis. The proliferation and satu-
ration of the domain of the ‘psychological’ means 
that relevant materials surround us. In particular, 
it brings into focus the everyday ways psychologi-
cal ideas circulate, rather than being confined to 
specialist policy or technical journals (although 
these are also of course important – even if their 
audiences are rather more restricted). Like banal 
nationalism and racism (Billig, 1995; Burman, 
2010), banal psychologism and its corollaries should 
exercise our attention, rather than being overlooked 
or excused as mere ‘pop psy’. (Hence my analysis of 
a social work advertising campaign earlier.)
But there are, of course, problems with decon-
structionist strategy as a critical tool. I will high-
light just three here. Firstly, there is a tendency to 
reproduce what they critique precisely by virtue of 
articulating this critique, rhetorically maintaining 
the entity under interrogation even through critiqu-
ing it (Burman & Maclure, in press; Elam, 1994). 
Second, as Foucault (1977) argued, those varieties 
of work that aim to improve or correct dominant 
models tend towards a reformism that underesti-
mates the depth of the problems with prevailing 
paradigms (as was indicated in the flurry of ‘re-
constructing’ psychology texts in the Anglophone 
literature of the 1970s, e.g. Armistead, 1974, which 
proved to be premature in terms of presuming the 
end of the discipline they critiqued). Third, these 
approaches are also subject to the postcolonial 
criticism that they function at a level of abstrac-
tion from contexts of practice such that they both 
overstate their difference from and also ignore the 
varieties, instabilities and contradictions of their 
reception and enactment within local practices (see 
e.g. Kothari, 2005). 
Returning to the role of feminist analyses we 
should note that, theoretically and methodologi-
cally, feminist analysis is both constructionist and 
deconstructionist; modernist and postmodernist. 
Its project of envisioning social change presup-
poses a relativism in order to conceptualise that 
things have been and could be different, alongside 
a practical-political engagement to realise such 
changes (and in that sense prefigure a different 
teleology). As Lombardo and Verloo note: ‘The 
feminist combination of constructionist and decon-
structionist approaches feeds the ongoing struggle 
that enables the continuous generation of different 
partial, sometimes conflicting, positions in feminist 
debates; these keep the movement and its practices 
alive, and up to newly emerging challenges and op-
portunities’ (2009, pp. 110-111).
2. The psychosocial: The turn to affect
Emotions, or ‘affects’, feature significantly in cur-
rent political and academic agendas. Whether as 
critique of scientistic objectivity (Hollway, 1989), or 
as a reflexive grounding practice in social science 
analysis, emotions are increasingly being mobilised, Disciplines for anD against psychology
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textualised and discussed (see e.g. Clough, 2007; 
Tamboukou, 2003). As incitement to confess or to 
resist (or both of these), this turn poses new chal-
lenges for critical psychologists. While it owes much 
to the strategies and impact of feminist critiques, 
this academic interest has emerged alongside and 
in part to analyse, the intensification of practices of 
psychologisation and individualisation that exem-
plify the neoliberal project: of instrumentalization 
and maximization of hitherto untapped human 
resources (De Vos, 2009, in press; De Vos & Gordo 
Lopez, 2010; Rose, 1989). As I have already indi-
cated, these contemporary practices of (what might 
be called) emotionalisation range from the psychic 
flexibility to deal with insecure conditions, to the 
injunction to keep working on one’s development 
to fit the shifting demands of the labour market 
(Fendler, 2001; Morini, 2007). This emotionalisa-
tion includes attention to the ‘irrationality’ of the 
Euro-US markets that produced the downward 
spiral of the market crash and the implosion of the 
banks in late 2008, with significant connections 
to that other affective economy of global insecu-
rity that generates the spurious but potent links 
between ‘immigrant’ and ‘terrorist’, for (a key) ex-
ample (Ahmed, 2004). 
Moreover in terms of shifting gender relations, 
as the World Bank and IMF turn to women and 
children’s work as a final untapped economic re-
source (Nieuwenhuys, 2007), it is stereotypically 
feminine relational skills that are acquiring new 
value in post-industrial, service-sector based econo-
mies (Gordo Lopez & Burman, 2004). Thus the la-
bour which turned the wheels of industrial moder-
nity, the traditional physical labour of the working 
class with its values of hard work, physical strength 
and reliability is now displaced and de-skilled in 
the neoliberal economy, along with the traditional 
modes of racialised and classed masculinity as-
sociated with this. Within UK social policy, for 
example, the incitement to intervention has corre-
spondingly shifted to problematise men’s health and 
mental health, with men’s physical and psychologi-
cal vulnerability (with countless undiagnosed medi-
cal and mental health difficulties – from diabetes to 
depression) now a key policy focus. Perhaps it is no 
accident that it is now men’s problematic emotions 
that are the subject of concern. From ‘knife crime’ 
to ‘road rage’, the gendered expression of anger 
wrought of dispossession and alienation can now 
be cast as an individual skills deficit. 
In the UK a new (version of an old) discipline 
is being formed called ‘psychosocial studies’. This 
moves beyond (but probably also owes something 
to) the discourse of psychosocial interventions in 
relation to humanitarian emergencies – which for 
some time have recognised the ‘psycho’ in the ‘so-
cial’ as well as the scientific-technological aspects 
of aid. Given the enthusiasm with which psychoso-
cial studies has been taken up in the UK academy 
(Clarke & Hoggett, 2009; Frosh, 2010), it is relevant 
to connect this ‘affective turn’ with similar shifts in 
psychotherapy. In the early years of the twenty first 
century, ‘emotional literacy’ was actively promoted 
by some educators and therapists despite its nakedly 
commercial and cognitive origins (in the notion of 
‘emotional intelligence’). Psychotherapists allied 
with policy makers of the new labour strategy of 
‘social inclusion’, hoping that the broader project 
of the promotion of emotional well-being could be 
connected with this (e.g. Orbach, 2001). 
While we have yet to see how therapists will 
respond to the new British coalition government 
discourse of the ‘big society’7 (although the cur-
rent vogue for ‘mindfulness’ and ‘mentalisation’ 
approaches have been anticipating such moves for 
some time), the linking of goals for individual and 
social change leads to some obvious problems. Such 
examples clarify how a more emotionally sensitive 
agenda is not necessarily any less signed up to capi-
talizing on emotions than a cognitivist one, for psy-
choanalytic practitioners (such as Bowlby & Win-
nicott) were from the beginning keen to bring the 
good news for management and government (Riley, 
1983). In the name of promoting ‘social inclusion’, 
the usual sequelae of psychologisation nevertheless 
7   The ‘big society’ is the flagship phrase of the new conservative-
dominated British coalition government (from May 2010) where 
it seems that rather being a big society, rather society is composed 
of big individuals – as indicated by the rapid privatisation of major 
government functions underway to be run instead by big busi-
nesses.Erica Burman
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appear - in the form of stripping the context away 
from the subject with all the usual risks of victim-
blaming. Having been left out of the picture - state 
support and intervention can then re-enter only 
as and how they like. This is alongside the classic 
hallmarks of the workings of a ‘risk society’ – with 
individuals bearing the mark of ‘risk’, not only now 
on their bodies but also in their minds, giving rise 
to the societal imperatives to assess and clean up 
errant interiorities - cue the rise (and rise) of cogni-
tive behavioural and ‘mindfulness’ therapies.
I note such developments as a cautionary tale, 
which link back to psychoanalysis as well as psy-
chology. Right now, the question of the role of psy-
choanalysis as a conceptual model (to connect the 
world of feeling and of fact, agency and structure 
etc.) and as technology (to investigate this) is po-
larising this new community of self-styled critical 
academics. Is psychoanalysis necessary to, or even 
necessarily a critical resource for, this new hybrid 
discipline? (Burman, 2008c; Frosh, 2010; Frosh & 
Baraitser, 2008; Parker, 2008). While perhaps also 
a narcissism of minor differences, major political 
tensions are being played out through apparently 
conceptual or disciplinary commitments. For many 
former leftists and feminists, deeply affected by 
the failure of European supposedly communist 
states, psychoanalysis has come to replace rather 
than supplement their politics, with the project of 
political change through personal transformation 
seeming one of the only routes left open. Interest-
ingly contestations over the claim to psychoanalysis 
in psychosocial studies also link to the question of 
whether other theories can work as conceptual re-
sources for this new discipline (Brown & Stenner, 
2009).
3. Neopositivism
 
Perhaps I scarcely need to mention this third turn. 
The new era of global economic recession has fol-
lowed swiftly a rise of fundamentalism in all modes 
of thinking – not only religious but also cultural and 
intellectual. Significantly this poses many problems 
for feminist movements and women’s increasing 
economic and sexual liberties. In state policy do-
mains there have been increasing moves away from 
methodological diversity and attentiveness to inno-
vative research approaches back to a scientism that 
also mobilises the pseudo-democratic discourses of 
transparency and accountability (Maclure, 2005). 
Yet what is happening is that we are being made 
into more accountable subjects, who are increasingly 
surveyed – our movements and habits documented, 
recorded all the time – but with less and less atten-
tion to our actual subjectivities. It is in this sense 
that De Vos (in press) cogently argues that current 
governmental modes of psychologisation in fact 
evacuate, rather than prescribe, subjectivity. Policies 
evaluating state health and education systems – fol-
lowing the US models of ‘No Child Left Behind’ and 
more (we have our own versions of this in the UK 
with ‘Every Child Matters’) and various forms of 
‘managed care’ have been defining ever more restric-
tively the forms of research and service evaluation 
that will be deemed acceptable, instilling norms of 
experimental random control and blind allocation 
to conditions as the only ‘gold standard’ that return 
us back to the first line of criticism of the application 
of scientific procedures to reflexive psychological 
subjects (Denzin, 2006). All this hardline think-
ing is of a piece with the revival of other hardwired 
analyses – of the neuro-evolutionary paradigm now 
sweeping through psychiatry, health, etc, and in 
which evolutionary psychology is flourishing. 
The mapping of the human genome seemed 
to restore faith in the project of scientific, rational 
technological progress. But it won’t be long before 
the far-fetched claims engendered will have to 
become tempered – for as we psychologists know 
only too well, any genotype can only realised within 
specific phenotypes which are contingent on a host 
of sociohistorical conditions… so the problems of 
nature and nurture that were hailed to be solved 
by such discoveries are merely restated anew but in 
so fascinating a guide as to be beguiling.
Conclusion: Disciplines for 
and against psychology
Consideration of these three turns, and their wider 
cultural-political conditions, enables us to recon-Disciplines for anD against psychology
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sider the role of psychology as a discipline and its 
role in responding to the demands of the times. It 
was the early psychologists of the twentieth century 
who responded to British government demands to 
invent testing as a way of sorting and classifying 
people for purposes as diverse as determining who 
was (in)educable, who was fit to fight colonial wars, 
and who was fit to work (Rose, 1985), thus paving 
the way for psychologists to serve and show their 
usefulness to the modern bourgeois state. 
It is nevertheless important not to overstate the 
role of psychology. As one originator of the concept 
of the ‘psy complex’, David Ingleby, pointed out in 
an early critique: ‘Psychologists claim to be social 
engineers, but turn out to be really maintenance 
men’ (1972, p. 57). In a particularly relevant reflec-
tion, Nikolas Rose (1999) further notes that ‘…
expertise is heterogeneous. Its characteristic style 
of activity is bricolage… only later is the attempt 
to ratify the coherence of this array of procedures 
and forms of thought, to formalize them as a cer-
tain ‘specialism’… (ibid). This is what enables it to 
inform and colonize other disciplinary, professional 
and social practices in its “generosity”’ (p. 87). Rose 
emphasises psychology’s disparate and responsive 
character – as confirming and consolidating re-
ceived ideas and procedures, to give them spurious 
credibility, rather than offering any genuinely new 
or coherent model. It is in this sense that psychol-
ogy is a recursive technology of subjectivity that 
confirms its own expertise; that is, enabling it to 
occupy the status of both commonsense and mys-
tificatory jargon.
But, as indicated by the three examples with 
which I began, the relation to other disciplines is 
not simply one of mutual deference, nor of replacing 
the discipline of psychology with another – history 
or anthropology, for example. Cultural psychology 
has faced this conundrum for some time – it is not 
a question of ‘going native’ in another discipline, for 
(as I was indicating earlier in relation to Women’s 
Studies) each discipline can reproduce the same 
set of problems (around epistemology and ontol-
ogy, for example) in its own way. Hence doing a 
bit of cultural tourism in another discipline simply 
reiterates the dynamics of homogenising and es-
sentialising multiple and diverse cultural practices 
that we know happens in the more physical travel 
variety. So I am not advocating replacing psychol-
ogy with another discipline. Nor is it a matter of 
setting these disciplines alongside each other in 
separate (if uneasy) co-existence (as is the case 
in much ‘multidisciplinary’ practice) whereby pre-
vailing power relations and hierarchies are simply 
reproduced (as where the psychiatrist is ‘top dog’ 
in any multidisciplinary mental health team, and 
the medical model prevails). Nor, it seems to me, 
can we imagine that we can dispense with dis-
ciplinary distinctions in some easy discourse of 
‘interdisciplinarity’ – for this move is something 
that has to be built in a self-conscious way, and in 
a climate of mutual suspicion as well as respect. I 
have been suggesting that feminisms – with their 
hybrid epistemological and methodological com-
mitments – may be especially suited to be a critical 
resource for mobilizing and evaluating knowledge 
claims across disciplines, and - better still - in con-
necting with practice.
In this paper I have applied a feminist criti-
cal focus to the questions of disciplines and made 
the case for feminist psychologists to also become 
antipsychologists as part of the move to critique 
contemporary modes of psychologisation as the 
instrumentalisation of emotions and the promotion 
of individual responses to structural and resource 
limitations of twenty first century neoliberal times. 
I suggested that feminists need to be antipsycholo-
gists in part because of the antifeminist turn that 
may be instituted precisely by the resistance to 
these new psychological regimes, also to demon-
strate that although the emotional turn may use 
the discourse of femininity, it is far from feminist 
(and indeed often women have disappeared from it 
too). I then turned to consider how commonplace 
representations of psychological knowledge include 
both explicit and implicit gendered, raced and 
classed assumptions that have significant bearing 
on the formulation of normalised and pathologised 
subjects. 
What feminist antipsychologists – as also psy-
chologists – can do is to unravel such constella-
tions of meanings, both conceptually and also by Erica Burman
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analysing the emotional dynamics they set in train, 
to better equip social and political analysis, critical 
intervention and activism. Of course feminism is 
not the only resource – it is perhaps merely indica-
tive of other frameworks that combine a distinct 
theoretical perspective with a commitment to en-
gagement and intervention in practice – such as is 
also the case with postcolonial, queer and disability 
theories and activism - that means that the critique 
can never rest at the level of theory alone.
This analysis is useful in the current context 
where the arena of critical psychology is increas-
ingly gaining recognition, and has made substantial 
interventions in psychology and about psychology 
– including highlighting the origins and problems of 
the rational unitary subject of modern mainstream 
psychology (Henriques et al., 1984). It has both 
transitional and revolutionary elements (e.g. Parker, 
2007) as well as inevitably risking recuperation as it 
gains more credibility. However, a particular benefit 
of claiming feminism as antipsychology is that it 
sidesteps the interminable preoccupations of criti-
cal psychologists about whether, how, or how much 
they are (or their work is) part of psychology. But it 
also mobilises the widest reaches of feminist inquiry 
and brings these to bear on more parochial psycho-
logical matters. In this regard, I would not want 
to colonise or limit feminist debates, in the sense 
of confining them merely to being antipsychology 
(perhaps they are also antisociology, for example?). 
I will end by indicating some specific disciplin-
ary implications. To psychologists, this paper has 
aimed to clarify how too easy slippage of this dis-
ciplinary discourse secures the interests of wider 
political agendas. To those who dismiss psychol-
ogy, there are indications that not only psychol-
ogy is complicit with and shaped by such agendas. 
Alternatively, to those (including psychologists) 
who overstate the importance of psychology, the 
analysis here suggests how malleable and slight 
are the psychological claims mobilised, despite (or 
rather precisely because of) their wide (trans)cul-
tural reference and circulation. Finally, as a feminist 
antipsychological intervention, it is fitting to end 
by noting that particular challenges are posed by 
this account also for feminist approaches, in forging 
analyses that ward off either the absolute separation 
of, or the merging, of women’s with other positions.
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